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We explore the relationship between the choice of the strategy space
and outcomes in Tullock contests. In particular, in a framework where
one of the contest￿ s participants moves ￿rst, we show that there is an
equilibrium where this individual wins the contest with probability one.
We also show that not only the nature of the outcome changes (e.g.,
who wins the contest) with the choice of the strategy space but also that
a contest organiser might have preferences over this space. We argue
that ultimately the analyst does not have complete freedom to choose the
strategy space. Instead, he or she should consider the strategies that are
permitted by the organisers of a formal contest, whose interests might lie
in maximising returns. That is, the analyst￿ s choice of the strategy space
is not neutral.
JEL: C7.
Kewords: Strategy space, Tullock contests.
11 Introduction
There are many strategic interactions where agents spend resources to dispute
some rent or prize. There is a large literature, which perhaps can be loosely
labelled as the economics of contests, that examines this type of strategic in-
teractions. It is commonly assumed in this literature that agents have only one
instrument to in￿ uence the outcome￿ s choice by the decision maker ￿usually
this instrument is referred to as e⁄ort or payment. 1 However, several authors
have pointed out that there are many other instruments available to players
in a rent-seeking game or contest. For example, Haan and Schoonbeek (2003)
examine a rent-seeking contest where players spend both money and e⁄ort to
in￿ uence decision makers. In the same vein, Konrad (2000) considers the in-
teraction of standard e⁄ort and sabotage (e⁄ort that reduces particular rivals￿ s
performance). Perhaps not surprisingly, these authors obtain results that are
quite distinct from those in the literature where agents have only one instru-
ment.
In this note we deal with an even more fundamental problem. The same
interaction may be modelled with di⁄erent descriptions of the instruments avail-
able to the players. In an oligopoly game, for example, any given player may be
regarded as choosing a price, a quantity or a markup, given the residual demand
curve conditional on the choices of the other players. If these di⁄erent repre-
sentations of instruments are taken to determine the strategy space available to
the players, di⁄erent equilibrium outcomes arise.2
Most of the strategic contests that have been analysed using a game-theoretic
framework are ￿ games without rules.￿ Unlike, say, poker or chess, or the for-
malised interactions of an auction, there is no rulebook that speci￿es the strate-
gies that interest groups disputing a rent might adopt. Hence, any proposed
game-theoretic representation is, in essence, a ·conjectural variations￿model,
in which the conjecture is that other players will choose to hold constant some
1For an excellent survey of this literature the reader is refereed to Konrad (2004).
2The quantity (Cournot) and price (Bertrand) equilibria are well known. Grant and Quiggin
(1994) examine the case of equilibrium in markups.
2particular variable, described as their ·strategy.￿The fact that a player may be
modelled as setting the value of an instrument to in￿ uence outcomes does not
necessarily imply that the contest is a game with values of the instrument as
strategies.
Elsewhere we argue that, in economic analysis, outcomes, and not strategies,
are the natural primitives.3 In this paper we formally show that the mere
speci￿cation of the rule relating payo⁄s to contributions tells us very little about
the equilibrium outcome(s) of the contest. Indeed, with the appropriate choice
of the strategy space, it is possible to obtain distinct and meaningful outcomes.
2 Outcomes and the choice of the strategy space
Consider a Tullock contest, for example an election or an all-pay auction, in







The payo⁄ to player i is ui(pi;p￿i) = ￿i ￿ pi:4
A standard approach to this problem is to model the contest as a game in
which the strategy space for player i consists of contribution levels pi; then to
consider possible Nash equilibria of the game. Commonly, the speci￿cation of
the strategy space is read directly from the contest description given above, with
no further discussion of players￿beliefs, institutional structures and so on.
One strong prediction of this model is that there are no Nash equilibria in
which only one player contributes, winning with probability 1. The argument
is reasonably straightforward. Consider a candidate equilibrium in which p1 >
0;pj = 0 for _ j 6= 1: Then player 1 can bene￿t by reducing her contribution. Also,
if p1 is small enough, other players can bene￿t by contributing. More formally,
3Menezes and Quiggin (2004).





; where ￿i is an e⁄ectiveness variable.
3@u1
@p1 = ￿1 at p2 = p3 = ::: = pn = 0: Similarly, Player 2￿ s best response when
p1 > 0 and p3 = ::: = pn = 0 is such that @u2
@p2 = 1
p1 ￿ 1 > 0 at p2 = 0. Thus,
Player 2￿ s best reply to p1 > 0 and p3 = ::: = pn = 0 involves a positive e⁄ort
or contribution.
Indeed, in this game, the unique (symmetric) Nash equilibrium is such that
pi = n￿1
2n = p for i = 1;:::;n: To see this, note that n￿1





(p1+(n￿1)p)2 ￿ 1 = 0.
That is, under a strategy space where players choose a contribution level pi,
the prediction is that all players will make positive and identical contributions.
In reality, though, uncontested elections are common. Indeed, we show next that
it is possible to obtain this as an equilibrium outcome of asymmetrical games
with di⁄erent speci￿cations of the strategy space, in which the uncontested
winner is the ￿rst mover.
For example, suppose that player 1￿ s strategy space is given by a probability
of winning ￿￿
1,0<￿￿
1 < 1; with the special interpretation of a minimal contri-
bution ￿1 if all other players choose 0, in which case player 1 receives the prize
with probability 1. For _ j 6= 1; the strategy spaces consist of contribution levels
pj; as before, and again we avoid continuity problems by requiring that either
pj = 0 or pj > ￿j for some ￿j > 0:
That is, having chosen ￿￿
1; and conditional on the (non-zero) strategies pj of








It￿ s apparent that the symmetric Nash equilibrium of the standard Tullock
game is also a Nash equilibrium of the new game. To check this, note that if
player 1 chooses ￿￿
1 consistent with a contribution p1 = n￿1
2n , it is a best reply for
players 2;:::;n to contribute p = n￿1
2n : Similarly, when players 2;:::;n contribute
p = n￿1
2n , player 1￿ s best reply is to choose ￿￿
1 = 1
n, which is consistent with a
contribution of p1 = n￿1
2n :
However, there is also an additional family of Nash equilibria where player 1
4makes the minimal contribution ￿ and receives the prize with probability 1. To
see this, observe that, if ￿1 > 1 ￿ 1
￿j;8j 6= 1; the best-reply strategy for player
j is pj = 0;8j 6= 1: Conversely, given that all pj = 0;8j 6= 1; the choice of ￿1 is
weakly optimal, since player 1 pays ￿1 and receives the prize regardless of the
choice of ￿1: Since player 1 moves ￿rst, this is subgame perfect. (The family
of such equilibria, corresponds to values of ￿￿






but the outcome is the same in each case).
There are many other speci￿cations of strategies we might consider, consis-
tent with the outcome description. For example, players might specify demand
curves for the good, . To work this out a bit further, suppose each player
nominates a value vi for the good, indicating willingness to pay pi =
p
￿vi for












Observe that, in this context, if one player reduces their o⁄er, the others increase
theirs.



































































In the symmetric equilibrium, @u1
@v1 jv1=y= 0: This yields




and ￿1 = ￿2 = 0:5;p1 = p2 = 1
3: That is, a Nash equilibrium in this setup will
not normally be a Nash equilibrium of the original game. Moreover, as the total
amount paid will be higher in this case, organisers of an all-pay auction might
prefer this rule.
3 Conclusion
The main point, then, is that the mere speci￿cation of the rule relating payo⁄s to
contributions tells us very little about the equilibrium outcome(s) of the contest.
Only if we have information about the strategy space can we apply tools of game
theory such as Nash equilibrium. In the case of a formal contest, such as an all-
pay auction, such information might be directly observable. Alternatively, we
might be able to collect behavioral information on the set of players, indicating
what kinds of descriptions of patterns of play correspond to the game-theoretic
notion of strategies.
The fact that equation 1 provides a simple and compact rule for determining
the winning probabilities does not necessarily mean that it is relevant in deter-
mining the strategy space. Most obviously, in the case of a formal contest, the
strategies are those permitted by the organisers, whose interests lie in maximis-
ing returns rather than in simple and compact rules. Even in an informal game,
the fact that some description of the outcomes is simple and compact does not
mean that participants will employ this representation of their interactions with
other players.
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